권위주의 정권의 외줄타기: 체제 불안정성과 정부 효율성에 따른 국제기구 참여

초록

Authoritarian regimes are generally inclined to avoid external interference and normative pressure in order to preserve internal cohesion. Under what conditions, then, do such regimes actively participate in international organizations (IOs)? This study addresses this apparent paradox by focusing on the interaction between a regime’s survival needs and the state capacity required to operationalize them. Departing from existing studies that emphasize the independent effects of single factors, this research advances a conditional argument: while regime instability may generate demand for international organizational participation, such demand does not translate into actual engagement unless it is supported by sufficient capacity, specifically government effectiveness. In other words, regimes that are simultaneously threatened yet capable are most likely to strategically employ IO participation as a survival strategy. To test this argument, the study analyzes panel data from 79 authoritarian countries between 2002 and 2022 using fixed-effects models. The results demonstrate that the interaction term between regime instability and government effectiveness has a statistically significant positive effect on the level of IO participation. This finding is further corroborated by a case analysis of Thailand following the 2014 military coup. By empirically showing that authoritarian regimes’ international engagement varies according to the combination of crisis intensity and governing capacity, this study refines our understanding of the external strategies of non-democratic regimes.

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