DISKSHIELD: A Data Tamper-Resistant Storage for Intel SGX

Citations

SCOPUS

15

초록

With the increasing importance of data, the threat of malware which destroys data has been increasing. If malware acquires the highest software privilege, any attempt to detect and remove malware can be disabled. In this paper, we propose DISKSHIELD, a secure storage framework. DISKSHIELD uses Intel SGX to provide Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to the host, implements the file system into SSD firmware that provides a Trusted Computing Base (TCB), and uses a two-way authentication mechanism to securely transfer data from the host TEE to the SSD TCB against data tampering attacks. This design frees DISKSHIELD from attacks to the kernel. To show the efficacy of DISKSHIELD, we prototyped a DISKSHIELD system by modifying Intel IPFS and developing a device file system on the Jasmine OpenSSD Platform in a Linux environment. Our results show that DISKSHIELD provides strong data tamper resistance the throughput of read and write is on average to 28%, 19% lower than IPFS. © 2020 ACM.

키워드

OS securitystorage securitytrusted computing
제목
DISKSHIELD: A Data Tamper-Resistant Storage for Intel SGX
저자
Ahn, JinwooLee, JungheeKo, YungwooMin, DonghyunPark, JiyunPark, SungyongKim, Youngjae
DOI
10.1145/3320269.3384717
발행일
2020-10-05
유형
Conference Paper
저널명
Proceedings of the 15th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ASIA CCS 2020
페이지
799 ~ 812