Dichotomous monism: Fichte's case for the idealism of original duality

초록

In this chapter, the author presents his case for what he call 'dichotomous monism,' a view of idealism that derives its main impetus from the original duality that is inherent in the dynamic and active nature of the I without distorting our robust sense of the reality of the objective world. J. G. Fichte's view is a monism inasmuch as it holds that there is a single principle of origin that he calls the 'I,' which serves as the foundation for all our knowledge. At the same time, this principle of origin is dichotomous because it is, despite its unity, primordially dual in its nature. For Fichte, this deficiency in immanuel Kant is importantly due to the lack of any firm conception of the I in its self-constitution, resulting in the disunity or schism between theoretical reason and practical reason. © 2022 selection and editorial matter Joshua Farris and Benedikt Paul Göcke. All rights reserved.