Asymmetric Reciprocal Preferences in International Agreements

초록

This study examines how asymmetric reciprocal preferences influence international agreements on global public goods, with some countries self-interested and others reciprocal that reward kindness and punish unkindness. In a noncooperative game, reciprocal countries exert less effort than self-interested ones when expectations exceed a perceived fairness threshold, potentially contributing nothing under strong reciprocity. However, their efforts surpass those under uniform reciprocity, as self-interested countries anchor their contributions. In a coalition-formation game, stable coalitions vary from nonexistent to encompassing all reciprocal countries, driven by the reciprocity strength and expectations. Small reciprocity yields small coalitions, whereas strong reciprocity and low expectations support larger coalitions, despite a lack of full cooperation. These results —derived through analytical modeling and numerical simulations— demonstrate how preference asymmetry influences both individual effort and treaty stability., offering insights for designing effective agreements in settings such as climate negotiations that are distinct from uniform preference models.

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