The commitment value of takeover defenses

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WEB OF SCIENCE

2
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SCOPUS

2

초록

We investigate how takeover defenses can facilitate a firm's value-increasing stakeholder relationships by bonding its commitment to respect stakeholders' appropriable quasi-rents in the firm. For this purpose, we develop two variations of the B-index of takeover defenses which are specifically designed to capture the bonding benefit of takeover defenses. We find evidence that some takeover defenses, but not all, provide a bonding benefit in terms of facilitation of a firm's value-increasing stakeholder relationships. This implies that a firm must selectively adopt the most effective takeover defenses to achieve the desired corporate goals.

키워드

Takeover defenses; antitakeover provisions; bonding; entrenchment; B-index; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; CUSTOMER; SUPPLIER
제목
The commitment value of takeover defenses
저자
Johnson, William C.; Nam, Sungwoo; Yi, Sangho
DOI
10.1080/1351847X.2018.1481444
발행일
2019-01-02
유형
Article
저널명
European Journal of Finance
권
25
호
1
페이지
79 ~ 100